Iraq Security Situation Overview – February 28, 2026

Executive Summary

Since the beginning of February 2026, Iraq’s security environment has remained outwardly controlled but structurally compressed by intersecting domestic, regional, and international pressures. The country has not experienced a dramatic spike in mass-casualty terrorism; however, February has demonstrated that Iraq’s principal vulnerability lies not in insurgent resurgence alone, but in geopolitical exposure, political paralysis, energy fragility, and cumulative economic stress.

At the start of February 2026, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, warned that any U.S. attack would trigger a “regional war.” On Feb. 10, an Iraqi militia leader echoed this warning, stating that an attack on Iran or Khamenei would lead to a “comprehensive war” and declaring foreign forces in Iraq legitimate targets, raising risks for diplomatic, military, and commercial facilities.

Amid intensified U.S.–Iran exchanges, Iraqi security services elevated alert levels around diplomatic missions and energy facilities on Feb. 2, continuing posture adjustments initiated in January after similar warnings and reflecting lessons from late 2025, when indirect regional escalation repeatedly produced security ripple effects inside Iraq without direct attack.

Tensions were further amplified on Feb. 6, when Iran conducted a missile exercise near Diyala province, signaling deterrence amid rising friction with the U.S. and potentially justifying expanded U.S. military positioning in Iraq.

On Feb. 18, the U.S. declared it would use all available tools to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in Iraq. The following day, Iran halted gas exports to Iraq, cutting approximately 5,500 megawatts from the national grid and worsening electricity shortages nationwide. That same day, reports emerged of expanded U.S. military deployments across the region, including increased aerial assets and surveillance activity over southern Iraq.

Although Geneva-based U.S.–Iran talks began on Feb. 20, tensions continued to tighten. On Feb. 23, U.S. forces started withdrawing from a major base in Syria toward northern Iraq, followed by additional coalition convoy movements.

By Feb. 26, Iran-aligned militia factions warned the Kurdistan Region against facilitating foreign military positioning. The most consequential development occurred on Feb. 28, when missiles were reportedly launched from Iraqi territory into Iran following Israeli–U.S. strikes. Within hours, Iraq closed its airspace, flights were halted in Erbil, and Lufthansa and other carriers canceled regional flights, reflecting immediate commercial and aviation disruptions. These developments mark Iraq’s most direct exposure to interstate escalation in years.

In response, Iran carried out direct retaliation by targeting U.S. military bases across the Gulf region with ballistic missiles and drones, striking facilities including a U.S. Navy logistics center in Bahrain and launching missiles near U.S. bases in Qatar and other Gulf states, significantly heightening risks for regional U.S. forces and further deepening the confrontation

Amid the intensifying U.S.-Iran confrontation, Iraq’s political stalemate continued to unfold. The unresolved prime ministerial contest, centered on the potential return of Nouri al-Maliki, continued to divide Iraq’s political blocs throughout the month. On Feb. 3, the United States warned Iraq it could restrict access to its oil revenue accounts if Maliki assumes office, following U.S. President Donald Trump’s Jan. 27 remarks opposing his return, which sparked the Jan. 28 demonstrations near the Green Zone, Baghdad.

The pressure intensified on Feb. 17 and again on Feb. 19, when the U.S. warned that Maliki’s nomination could trigger sanctions, underscoring how Iraq’s internal political process remains entangled with external strategic calculations and deepening internal Shia political fragmentation.

On Feb. 24, Iraq reportedly faced a new U.S. deadline to reconsider the nomination, while the Coordination Framework avoided naming an alternative candidate. On the same day, Maliki publicly vowed to pursue a return to office despite U.S. opposition, reinforcing polarization within ruling blocs. By Feb. 28, Maliki’s State of Law Coalition denied any retreat in his candidacy despite mounting diplomatic tension, illustrating the depth of the political deadlock.

Meanwhile, the delayed Feb. 7 presidential vote prolonged Iraq’s constitutional vacuum, complicated further by internal friction in the Kurdistan Region. On Feb. 8, authorities in Erbil banned several Taqaddum figures amid escalating disputes linked to Mohammed al-Halbousi’s presidential ambitions, highlighting continued fragmentation within elite political consensus and reinforcing the broader atmosphere of instability.

Throughout the month, Iraq also absorbed the strategic implications of completing the transfer of approximately 5,700 ISIS detainees from northeast Syria by Feb. 21. While kinetic ISIS activity inside Iraq remained limited to localized arrests and rural clearance operations, the mass detention burden shifts the threat environment toward prison management, radicalization risk, and long-term containment challenges.

These transfers follow U.S. officials’ Feb. 12 assessment that roughly 3,000 Islamic State fighters remain active across Iraq and Syria. Collectively, these developments significantly expand Iraq’s detention and judicial responsibilities, shifting part of the threat environment from insurgent maneuver to institutional containment.

On Feb. 5, multiple developments converged. German authorities announced a temporary reduction of troop presence in Erbil amid escalating U.S.–Iran tensions. The UN warned that ISIS remains a growing global threat as detainees are relocated to Iraq and affiliates expand in Africa. Syrian officials alleged that meetings had taken place to destabilize security in Iraq, while armed elements linked to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham threatened to disrupt Euphrates River flows to Iraq.

Furthermore, on Feb. 12, reports indicated that Syrian forces assumed control of Al-Tanf base following a U.S. withdrawal arrangement, altering the western security landscape adjacent to Iraq’s Anbar province and reducing a long-standing buffer in the border corridor.

In response to these evolving conditions, Baghdad on Feb. 14 publicly reaffirmed that Iraqi territory, waters, and airspace will not be used to launch attacks against other states, signaling an effort to insulate the country from intensifying U.S.–Iran tensions and prevent spillover escalation.

Turkey simultaneously expanded its engagement, holding defense-related discussions on Feb. 12 and announcing on Feb. 13 plans for expanded investment in Kirkuk’s oil infrastructure, reinforcing Ankara’s growing economic and strategic footprint in northern Iraq.

Tensions between Iraq and Kuwait remained high with a Kuwaiti drone conducting surveillance near Umm Qasr port on Feb. 16, highlighting continued scrutiny of Iraq’s southern approaches. Maritime tensions flared up again near Khor Abdullah between Feb. 26 and 27, as Kuwaiti patrol vessels confronted an Iraqi ship, following Baghdad’s updated UN maritime submission earlier in February.

Economic grievances fueled widespread public dissent in Iraq, marked by Feb. 3 gasoline price surges in Basra due to supply shortages and quota cuts, alongside sharp drops in Basra crude prices tied to U.S.-Iran diplomacy, stressing state finances and public confidence. This economic stress, combined with political pressure, reinforced perceptions of external influence over Iraq’s sovereignty.

Protests escalated with traders initiating market closures on Feb. 6 against new customs fees, expanding into a nationwide commercial strike by Feb. 8, and culminating in the Feb. 10 demonstrations outside Baghdad’s Supreme Judicial Council. These protests highlight frustration over fiscal policy adjustments perceived as burdensome amid fluctuating oil revenues and commodity supply volatility.

Public service disruptions and fuel shortages further intensified public discontent. As of Feb. 9, extensive petrol queues were reported in Karbala while authorities denied supply shortages, echoing parallel complaints regarding white oil scarcity in several provinces. These shortages have increased the risk of localized unrest and contributed to black-market fuel trading patterns that historically enable organized smuggling networks.

These economic pressures coincided with a sharp escalation of water stress in Iraq’s southern provinces, with the Feb. 21 record-low Al-Mashrah river levels in Maysan that left thousands without reliable access and the displacement of over 10,500 families by Feb. 24 in Dhi Qar due to water shortages.

Infrastructure and industrial incidents also influenced national security perceptions. On Feb. 9, a fire at the Baiji refinery’s petrol improvement unit killed two workers and injured thirteen others, temporarily disrupting refining operations and highlighting vulnerabilities in Iraq’s energy infrastructure. The same week, a major fire at Hamadi Shihab Hospital in Baghdad on Feb. 11 raised concerns regarding emergency response capacity and critical infrastructure resilience.

The cumulation of these stresses increased the probability of localized unrest as temperatures rose. The absence of large-scale violence should therefore be interpreted as conditional calm, sustained by deterrence calculations rather than improved fundamentals.

Iraq’s security landscape shifted in February 2026, with reduced insurgent violence from ISIS compared to the latter half of 2025, but the country faces greater strategic exposure to external escalation. The past month has seen sharper geopolitical compression, marked by airspace closure and missile exchanges, narrowing Iraq’s maneuvering space. Despite this, Iraq remains functional, albeit with limited room for diplomatic maneuvering.

Regional escalation dynamics, especially explicit U.S. warnings regarding Iraq’s political trajectory and Iranian rhetoric signaling readiness for regional conflict, have narrowed Iraq’s strategic space. The continuing absence of an empowered Iraqi government further exacerbates these dynamics by limiting proactive strategic responses.

In preparation for the commencement of Ramadan on Feb. 19, Iraqi security forces finalized and activated comprehensive security plans across major cities, religious sites, commercial districts, and key transportation corridors. The measures, which were prepared in advance of the holy month, include reinforced deployments around mosques and pilgrimage routes, expanded checkpoint coverage, increased night patrols during peak iftar and Taraweeh hours, and enhanced intelligence coordination to detect and disrupt potential threats. Given the historically heightened movement of civilians and the symbolic significance of Ramadan, authorities are prioritizing deterrence, crowd management, and rapid response readiness to mitigate risks associated with both extremist activity and opportunistic crime.

Looking ahead, near-term stability will depend on two primary variables. First, whether political blocs can reach a consensus on government formation without triggering external sanctions or internal fragmentation. Continued stalemate risks emboldening militia rhetoric and weakening centralized security coordination.

Second, regional escalation trajectories between Washington and Tehran will directly determine Iraq’s exposure to airspace disruptions, cross-border strikes, and militia mobilization.

If electricity shortages persist alongside deteriorating water conditions in southern provinces, protest dynamics could intensify by late March or early April. Iraq is not facing imminent collapse; however, the convergence of political paralysis, regional confrontation, detention burden, and environmental stress places the country in a reactive posture that reduces resilience to sudden shocks.

Al Baron Security’s adaptable approach stays ahead of shifting security threats, providing customized risk assessments, protection, and crisis management solutions to address the dynamic environment.

National Threat Overview

Terrorist Activity

Terrorist activity within Iraq in February 2026 remained unchanged and continues to reflect a residual and dispersed threat rather than large-scale coordinated operations. While local and security intelligence reports from the reporting period do not highlight significant ISIS-linked attacks inside Iraq, broader regional developments continue to influence ISIS dynamics.

On Feb. 1, AFRICOM conducted airstrikes in the Golis Mountains of Somalia targeting key ISIS planners, signaling that the group’s operational branches remain active globally. These operational ripples matter to Iraq because ISIS persists as a transnational extremist threat with cross-border remnants and recruitment networks potentially seeking safe havens or logistical routes extending from Syria into Iraq.

The Feb. 4 transfer of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq increased long-term risk, straining detention facilities already pressured by January transfers. The UN warned on Feb. 5 of a rising ISIS threat, citing growing branches in Africa and detainee transfers to Iraq, emphasizing containment doesn’t equal resolution.

On Feb. 8, Iraq accepted thousands of ISIS detainees from Syria for prosecution, with transfers exceeding 4,500 and 5,000 detainees confirmed on Feb. 10 and Feb. 11, respectively, as part of a U.S.-supported operation. This influx strains detention infrastructure, intelligence coordination, and judicial capacity, raising risks of prison radicalization, insider attacks, and escape scenarios.

The Feb. 6 ISIS-linked suicide bombing targeting a Shia mosque in Islamabad demonstrated the group’s continued operational reach across regions, reinforcing concerns that global ISIS branches remain capable of coordinated ideological and tactical expansion, which can influence Iraq-based recruitment and propaganda ecosystems.

Between Feb. 1 and 4, the PMF launched widescale security operations in Salah al-Din, Anbar, and Ghazaliyah district, targeting a suspected IS cell. The operations resulted in the arrest of Abu Ahmad, an IS-affiliated operative with ties to the Jazira desert network, the seizure of an explosives cache linked to an IS sleeper cell, and the capture of a senior terror suspect wanted under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law, on Feb. 1, 2, and 3, respectively. On Feb. 9, Iraqi forces uncovered additional ISIS explosives caches near Kirkuk, reinforcing intelligence that the group continues storing equipment for delayed operational deployment.

On Feb. 5, Iraqi security forces uncovered a significant ISIS weapons cache in southern Ar-Rutbah, Anbar province, containing heavy machine guns, RPG launchers, mortars, suicide belts, and IEDs, linked to militants rebuilding capabilities along the Syrian border. This reinforced assessments that ISIS has shifted towards logistical preparation and sleeper-cell activation.

Subsequent counterterrorism operations intensified, culminating on Feb. 11 in Anbar province, where Iraqi National Security Service forces dismantled a reorganizing ISIS network, arresting senior militant Abu Ayman al-Rawi, who was preparing a suicide attack, and detaining five others, highlighting ongoing militant recruitment and attack planning.

On Feb. 16, Kurdish officials warned that ISIS sleeper cells remain a threat across Iraq and Syria, echoing U.S. assessments from Feb. 12 on residual fighter numbers. This comes as Iraq takes custody of over 5,700 detainees transferred between Feb. 13 and 14, significantly altering the counterterrorism landscape.

The most strategically significant development occurred on Feb. 21 when Iraq confirmed completion of large-scale ISIS detainee transfers from Syria. This process, which began earlier in the month, expands Iraq’s custodial responsibilities and increases pressure on detention infrastructure.

The risk profile, therefore, transitions from insurgent maneuver to institutional containment. Prison radicalization, insider facilitation, and potential coordinated unrest inside detention facilities represent medium-term concerns.

While February did not witness a major ISIS mass casualty event inside Iraq, the structural burden of detainee management increases systemic risk over time.

Tribal and Armed Conflicts

Although the reporting period has not seen major tribal clashes on the scale witnessed in late 2025, underlying tensions remain deeply embedded within Iraq’s social fabric. Local disputes over resources, employment, and political representation continue to have the potential to escalate into armed confrontations.

Longstanding tribal disputes in the south and inter-communal friction remain a backdrop, especially given economic pressures registered on Feb. 3 with rising gasoline prices in Basra tied to supply shortages and quota cuts. Rising fuel costs have historically been catalysts for localized unrest and skirmishes over resources and livelihood opportunities, especially in oil-producing provinces.

On Feb. 1, a tribal dispute in Amara’s Um Ghurba area, Maysan, escalated into gunfire in a residential area. That same day in the Maghraba neighborhood, unknown gunmen targeted political figure Reda Hamid al-Naufli, firing at his car, though he survived. These incidents highlight the intertwined nature of tribal, political, and militia violence in southern Iraq, driven by pre-political realignment competition.

On Feb. 7, a tribal “dakkah” attack in Basra resulted in two fatalities following retaliatory armed intimidation targeting residential properties. The attack illustrated the persistence of tribal justice systems that frequently bypass state law enforcement, especially in oil-producing regions where economic hardship amplifies communal grievances.

External diplomatic tensions, especially between the U.S. and Iran over Iraqi political alignment, have also amplified political fissures within tribal and militia-linked constituencies, increasing the likelihood of sporadic incidents.

Sectarian tensions manifested through localized violence, with Feb. 10 attacks targeting Sheikhi religious sites in Basra, prompting security intervention and arrests. These incidents highlight vulnerabilities among minority communities, reflecting sectarian competition intersecting with tribal power structures and militia affiliations.

Political fragmentation fuels armed competition, exemplified by Feb. 8 authorities in Erbil banning Taqaddum party leaders amid parliamentary leadership disputes, exacerbating factional polarization and potentially increasing armed mobilization among politically aligned militias.

On Feb. 13, a police operation in Basra targeting a tribal dispute left one officer dead and three injured, with eight suspects arrested. The same day, Diyala saw renewed tensions following armed incidents, though authorities downplayed escalation. Meanwhile, Yezidi representatives in Sinjar on Feb. 16 warned of worsening security and external interference, highlighting governance gaps in disputed territories.

Tensions escalated on Feb. 24, with armed coalition factions accusing the US of airspace violations, alleging external manipulation of Iraq’s political process. Iran-aligned militias followed up on Feb. 26, warning of prolonged confrontation if Iran were targeted. The situation turned more volatile on Feb. 28, when missile launches from Iraqi territory were reported, coming after regional strikes on Iranian facilities.

While direct militia state confrontation did not materialize, the escalation illustrates how rapidly rhetoric can intersect with geopolitical conflict. The implication is that armed faction posturing is increasingly intertwined with external confrontation dynamics, lowering escalation thresholds and raising risks of retaliatory targeting within Iraq.

Crime and Smuggling

Economic strain fueled illicit activity in Iraq, with Feb. 3 gasoline shortages in Basra and quota cuts highlighting vulnerabilities exploited by criminal networks for fuel smuggling. Basra crude dropped by 5% on the same day amid global oil price shifts, incentivizing illicit activities like fuel diversion and black-market sales.

Nationwide trader strikes and market closures between Feb. 6 and 8, protesting customs tariffs, signal commercial instability, potentially enabling black-market expansion and customs evasion, especially at border crossings.

On Feb. 1, Border authorities at the Shalamcheh border crossing, Basra, arrested a foreign traveler attempting to smuggle 1Kg of crystal methamphetamine into Iraq; a day later, three Iranian women transporting over half a kilogram of crystal narcotics, which highlights Basra’s continued vulnerability as a narcotics transit corridor linked to regional trafficking networks operating through Iran and the Gulf.

On Feb. 5, Iraqi forces conducted a cross-border operation in Syria, arresting international drug traffickers and seizing approximately 300,000 narcotic pills, highlighting Iraq’s role as a transit hub for Gulf markets and Levantine trafficking routes. Further seizures on Feb. 5 and 6 in Anbar and Baghdad underscore the growth of synthetic drug markets like Captagon, linked to militia financing and cross-border smuggling corridors connecting Syria and Iran, indicating criminal enterprise drives armed group funding and corruption.

Domestic smuggling networks expanded in Iraq, with authorities arresting organ trafficking suspects and detaining 15 Asian migrants attempting unauthorized border crossings on Feb. 8, highlighting migrant exploitation by criminal organizations. Further arrests in Basra on Feb. 8 targeted suspects involved in kidnapping and theft linked to organized crime rings.

On Feb. 12, police operations across Iraq led to arrests in Babil of a house burglary gang, detentions in Basra and Najaf linked to armed car theft and a jewelry store robbery, and the seizure of approximately $70,000 in counterfeit currency in Kirkuk.

Iraq’s energy vulnerabilities were exposed following Iran’s Feb. 19 gas halt, leading to electricity shortfalls and fuel distribution issues. Meanwhile, anti-narcotics operations between Feb. 12 and 22 in Baghdad, Basra, and Anbar netted significant seizures of synthetic drugs, highlighting Iraq’s role as a transit and consumption hub.

The security situation was further complicated on Feb. 23, with Anbar authorities arresting suspects linked to organ trafficking and prostitution networks, revealing the growing presence of transnational exploitation structures along Iraq’s borders.

While organized crime remains primarily economically motivated rather than politically driven, its growth intersects with militia patronage systems and corruption, potentially undermining the rule of law. Persistent electricity shortages and economic stagnation may further incentivize illicit enterprise in peri-urban belts.

Kidnapping and Abductions

Although there weren’t any confirmed high-profile abductions in February, unresolved kidnap and abduction cases from January 2025, predominantly the unresolved detention of civil activist Ahmed al-Shujairi, arrested on Jan. 4, continue to cast a chilling effect over civil society and media circles.

Meanwhile, on Feb. 1, Muthanna Police rescued a juvenile girl hiding in a school after fleeing severe abuse by her family, including physical restraint. Just days later, on Feb. 4, Diyala Police in Baquba acted swiftly to rescue a minor girl abducted and transported toward Baghdad by an Egyptian suspect, recovering stolen valuables and arresting the suspect.

Additionally, on Feb 4, Kirkuk Police arrested three suspects for luring and sexually assaulting a minor over ten days, exposing the exploitation of internal mobility and digital platforms to facilitate abductions. These cases underscore the vulnerabilities of minors and the importance of inter-provincial coordination in countering such threats.

The most severe incident occurred on Feb. 16 near Nasiriyah, where a kidnapped couple and their 30-day-old infant were found shot dead. The brutality of the killings suggests retaliatory messaging or consolidation of criminal dominance in semi-rural districts. Economic strain, including fuel shortages and liquidity pressures reported on Feb. 14, may continue to incentivize organized criminal networks.

Iraq’s security forces made notable progress in combating kidnappings, with Najaf police rescuing a kidnapped teacher and restaurant owner on Feb. 5 and arresting suspects. This success was followed by the rescue of a kidnapped student in Babil on Feb. 6, with three suspects detained, and the freeing of a kidnapped boy in Amarah on Feb. 9 after a financial dispute. Despite these efforts, ransom-driven kidnappings persist, often targeting middle-class professionals in areas with economic stress and inadequate policing.

Furthermore, general insecurity along highways and regions where law enforcement remains stretched, including tribal-influenced southern provinces and peri-urban belts, continues to present kidnapping risks, especially in contexts of fuel shortages and social frustration.

Reports suggest that opportunistic abduction tactics continue to pose a threat in urban and peri-urban areas where law enforcement presence is uneven. The continued use of digital communication platforms to facilitate kidnapping operations, especially targeting youth, suggests that law enforcement faces growing challenges in monitoring online criminal coordination.

Traffic Collisions, Infrastructure, and Transportation Hazards

Transportation hazards and public safety incidents continue to reflect persistent structural challenges within Iraq’s infrastructure. Congestion, inclement weather conditions, and hazard-prone thoroughfares have contributed to a series of traffic collisions that strain emergency response resources and underscore the human cost of inadequate road safety measures.

On Feb. 2, fatal incidents in Najaf and Muthanna, a motorcycle collision and a fuel-related burn incident, highlighted nationwide road-safety and hazardous-materials handling challenges. Two days later, on Feb. 4, a gas tanker overturned in Babil’s Al-Nil subdistrict, injuring three and closing a main highway, posing secondary security risks due to infrastructure disruption and emergency response strain.

A catastrophic fire at the Baiji refinery petrol processing unit on Feb. 9 killed two workers and injured thirteen others, disrupting fuel production and worsening supply shortages across central Iraq, highlighting the vulnerability of Iraq’s ageing energy infrastructure. On the same day, unmarked armed guards controlled multiple Baghdad intersections to escort security convoys, causing severe congestion and public frustration, reflecting ongoing force protection concerns and friction between security operations and civilian mobility.

Additionally, a rocket-propelled grenade explosion during a family dispute in eastern Baghdad on Feb. 9 critically injured one individual, underscoring the widespread availability of military-grade weaponry and lingering consequences of decades of conflict and militia proliferation.

A drag racing incident in Basra on Feb. 13 left one dead and around ten spectators injured, while a fuel tanker overturned in Wasit province on Feb. 14 amid petrol shortages, highlighting reckless driving and supply disruption risks.

Conversely, on Feb. 12, Mosul International Airport moved closer to international certification after securing key regulatory approvals, signaling potential medium-term stabilization in Nineveh.

Iraq’s critical infrastructure vulnerabilities were exposed on Feb. 25, when Baghdad International Airport suspended operations due to a technical fault. The situation turned critical on Feb. 28, as Iraq closed its airspace following missile exchanges and regional strikes, halting flights in Erbil and prompting international carriers to suspend routes. This sudden airspace closure underscored the fragility of mobility and logistics for diplomatic, commercial, and humanitarian operations in the region.

These events, though not driven by militant action, nonetheless contribute to the overall insecurity experienced by the populace and amplify public frustration with state-level service delivery.

Border and International Military Movements

Border and military developments in the reporting period played a critical role in shaping Iraq’s security environment.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, warned on Feb. 1 that U.S. military action could spark regional war, highlighting Iraq’s western and northern borders as potential escalation points. This rhetoric was reinforced by a senior Iraqi militia leader on Feb. 10, who threatened regional warfare if Iran or its leadership were attacked.

Meanwhile, Syrian officials alleged on Feb. 5 that meetings aimed to destabilize Iraq’s security, with extremist-linked factions threatening to disrupt Euphrates River water flows, showcasing hybrid warfare tactics.

The heightened diplomatic messaging was further emphasized by reports on Feb. 1 that the U.S. and Israeli top generals met at the Pentagon to discuss rising tensions with Iran, reflecting convergent U.S.-Israel planning potentially affecting Iraq’s strategic space.

Internally, U.S. pressure on Iraq’s political process intensified on Feb. 3 with warnings tied to access to oil revenue if Maliki becomes prime minister, illustrating how foreign military-economic leverage is influencing Baghdad’s policy environment and militia alignments.

The continued framing of parliamentary authority through a foreign-policy lens has complicated consensus-building on sovereignty, security cooperation, and the future posture of international forces operating in or around Iraq.

Meanwhile, the reported transfer of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq on Feb. 4 places additional strain on border security and detention infrastructure, which can have significant implications for manpower distribution, detention policy, and cross-border militant mobility.

Germany, on Feb. 5, announced a temporary reduction of its military presence in the Kurdistan Region amid rising regional tensions between the U.S. and Iran. The move reflects international force-protection recalibrations rather than disengagement.

Turkey’s military operations in northern Iraq persist, with Ankara broadening its “Claw Lock” campaign on Feb. 5 to target Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) hideouts and landmines in mountainous border areas. Turkish officials intensified their rhetoric on Feb. 10, hinting at a possible new phase of operations against the PKK presence in Iraq, underscoring ongoing sovereignty tensions between Baghdad and Ankara.

Iranian military signaling intensified on Feb. 6, when missile exercises were conducted near Diyala province, raising concerns about ballistic capability deployments near Iraqi territory. Analysts warned that the presence of Iranian missile infrastructure in Iraq could provide a strategic justification for expanded U.S. military deployments, increasing the likelihood of Iraq becoming a confrontation arena between rival powers.

In the absence of a unified political front and following the closure of UNAMI, Iraq continues to maneuver in 2026 with fewer institutional buffers against regional escalation, leaving border security, foreign military presence, and militia positioning closely tied to unresolved political rivalries at the national level.

The U.S. issued a Level 4 “Do Not Travel” advisory for Iraq on Feb. 11, reinforcing the perception of elevated security risk due to terrorism, kidnapping, armed conflict, civil unrest, and limited emergency services for U.S. citizens.

On Feb. 14, Iraq approved a settlement with Lukoil concerning the West Qurna 2 field, while on Feb. 23, Chevron entered exclusive talks to manage West Qurna 2 and other oilfields, with a U.S envoy overseeing negotiations the same day. On Feb. 25, KBR secured a contract for the Majnoon oil field. While these deals promise revenue stabilization, they also deepen perceptions of U.S. leverage amid Iranian opposition narratives.

Maritime tensions in the Gulf intensified, with Kuwait-Iraq disputes over the Khor Abdullah boundaries resurfacing in February. Patrol confrontations between Feb. 26 and 27 near Khor Abdullah heightened scrutiny on commercial shipping, potentially impacting Umm Qasr port operations.

The Feb. 28 missile episode and nationwide airspace closure marked the peak of military escalation, highlighting Iraq’s vulnerability to regional conflict spillover, with direct impacts on mobility and infrastructure stability.

Natural Hazards

Environmental and natural hazards remain a persistent backdrop to Iraq’s broader security challenges. Harsh winter conditions, including fog, flooding, and infrastructure strain, continue to affect mobility, health services, and emergency response capabilities.

On Feb. 2, the Meteorological Authority issued aviation warnings for thunderstorms, and by Feb. 3, heavy rainfall knocked out power at Basra International Airport, briefly halting operations. On Feb. 18, authorities warned of up to 45 days of unstable weather patterns, including rainfall fluctuations and temperature shifts.

Lightning strikes in Duhok and rural Maysan on Feb. 14 resulted in fatalities among elderly residents, while a fire at a Yazidi displacement camp in Duhok injured at least one individual and destroyed temporary shelter structures on Feb. 17.

Drought conditions in the Hawizeh Marshes on Feb. 8 triggered displacement, drying key water channels and intensifying rural migration toward urban centers, increasing competition over scarce resources. However, Iran’s reopening of the Karun River on Feb. 8 temporarily improved water security, reducing salinity levels in Basra’s water supply. Despite this, shortages persisted due to infrastructure deficiencies and declining river flows, sustaining agricultural disruption and increasing economic migration pressures.

Fuel shortages worsened nationwide, with long queues forming in Karbala on Feb. 9, and shortages of petrol and white oil were reported across several provinces, though progress on the Gulf electricity interconnection project reported on Feb. 12 may provide partial mitigation beginning in April.

Iraq’s water crisis worsened on Feb. 21, with record-low river levels in Maysan disrupting water access for thousands. By Feb. 24, water shortages in Dhi Qar had displaced over 10,500 families, accelerating rural migration and straining urban infrastructure. Additionally, electricity shortages triggered by the Feb. 19 gas suspension have compounded public frustration. As temperatures rise, the convergence of water scarcity and electricity deficits increases the likelihood of localized protest activity.

These shortages pose significant stability risks, as they’ve historically been linked to protests, black-market growth, and localized violence over distribution access.

Threat Assessment

Risk Forecast and Recommendations.

Short-Term Risk Forecast (Next 30 Days)

Over the next 30 days, Iraq’s stability will remain conditionally intact but highly sensitive to external escalation dynamics, especially the U.S.–Iran tensions. The Feb. 28 missile exchanges, airspace closure, and retaliatory strikes on U.S. regional bases have narrowed Iraq’s strategic maneuvering space, increasing the likelihood of further airspace disruptions, militia mobilization, or indirect targeting of diplomatic and military facilities should confrontation intensify.

While large-scale ISIS attacks remain unlikely in the immediate term, the expanded detention burden of over 5,700 transferred fighters elevates medium-term institutional risk, including prison unrest, radicalization, or escape attempts.

Border corridors in Anbar, Nineveh, and the Kurdistan Region will remain sensitive, especially if foreign military repositioning continues. The absence of a fully empowered government compounds exposure, limiting coordinated crisis response capacity.

Domestically, economic and environmental stressors are likely to represent the most immediate triggers for unrest. Electricity shortages following the Feb. 19 gas suspension, persistent fuel distribution disruptions, and worsening water scarcity in Maysan and Dhi Qar increase the probability of localized protests, mainly as temperatures rise and Ramadan-related mobility remains elevated.

Southern provinces, including Basra, Maysan, and Dhi Qar, face a heightened risk of service-driven demonstrations, road blockages, and opportunistic criminal activity, including smuggling and kidnapping.

While nationwide destabilization is not imminent, Iraq will remain in a reactive security posture through late March, with stability contingent on de-escalation between the United States and Iran, progress in government formation, and the state’s ability to mitigate service shortages before they translate into sustained public mobilization.

Al Baron’s Recommendations.

Al Baron Security advises clients operating in Iraq to adopt a multi-layered security approach:

• Journey Management – Implement detailed risk assessments before travel, use armored vehicles, and establish Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) for contingency support, especially when operating outside secure zones like Baghdad International Zone and Erbil.
• Facility Security – Strengthen physical security of compounds, hotels, and offices with controlled access, perimeter surveillance, and regular security drills to prepare for emergencies.
• Protective Services – Deploy professional Protective Security Detail (PSD) teams trained in counter-IED tactics, drone threat response, and close protection to mitigate risks from insurgent and militia actors.
• Real-Time Intelligence – Utilize Al Baron’s ThreatMapR platform for continuous threat updates, incident mapping, and strategic advisory to anticipate and respond to emerging threats.
• Community Engagement – Develop liaison channels with tribal leaders, local authorities, and humanitarian organizations to enhance operational security and facilitate conflict resolution.
• Medical Preparedness – Prepare for environmental and health risks by securing medical evacuation plans, stocking treatment supplies for heatstroke, dehydration, and foodborne illnesses.

Conclusion.

February 2026 demonstrated that Iraq’s security environment is defined less by immediate insurgent resurgence and more by cumulative strategic pressure. While large-scale ISIS attacks remained limited, the country faced intensified geopolitical compression driven by U.S.–Iran confrontation, missile exchanges, airspace closures, and expanding militia rhetoric.

Simultaneously, political paralysis, external influence over government formation, and shifting foreign military postures constrained Baghdad’s strategic flexibility. The transfer of thousands of ISIS detainees, combined with persistent tribal tensions and organized criminal activity, has shifted risk from battlefield confrontation to institutional resilience and internal containment capacity.

At the same time, economic fragility, fuel shortages, electricity deficits, water scarcity, and infrastructure vulnerabilities amplified public frustration and increased the potential for localized unrest.

Iraq remains functional and operational, but stability is increasingly deterrence-based rather than structurally reinforced. The convergence of regional escalation, governance stagnation, environmental stress, and economic pressure places Iraq in a reactive posture heading into the coming months, where even limited external shocks or service disruptions could generate disproportionate internal consequences.